Ford’s changes to electoral system warrants monitoring

Editorial

Last updated on Oct 30, 25

Posted on Oct 30, 25

2 min read

Ontario’s newly announced package of electoral changes would remove fixed election dates, raise the individual donation cap to $5,000, and permanently enshrine per-vote public subsidies for political parties.

The Ford government frames these moves as restoring historical flexibility to the province’s parliamentary practice and as preparing Ontario to respond quickly to crises or shifting circumstances. That was Doug Ford’s rationale for calling an election earlier this year under the heightened circumstances surrounding Donald Trump’s return in the U.S.

The proposed changes would repeal the statutory requirement for elections to occur on a fixed schedule, increase the maximum allowable donation from individuals to political parties to $5,000 annually from $3,400 today (with inflationary increases thereafter) and make the per vote subsidy to parties permanent rather than temporary or discretionary.

The government describes fixed dates as an “American style” innovation that interrupted a long tradition of flexible parliamentary dissolution, while portraying the donation increase and permanent subsidy as modernization of party funding rules.

Repealing the fixed four-year election schedule restores a century-old parliamentary norm that gives the premier discretion to advise dissolution. That discretion can be defensible in emergencies. In ordinary political life it becomes a tactical tool: incumbents will time campaigns to exploit favourable polls, opposition weakness or distracted media cycles.

A five-year maximum between elections mitigates the worst excesses, but it does not remove the incentive to call elections for narrow political advantage, nor the uncertainty that burdens election administrators, community groups and campaign volunteers.

A 47 per cent increase in the annual donation ceiling materially alters fundraising dynamics. Larger caps make cultivating high capacity donors a higher value activity and tilt parties toward targeted major donor cultivation rather than grassroots small donor engagement. The Ford government insists businesses and unions remain barred, but individual wealth alone can concentrate influence: a handful of $5,000 donors replace many smaller contributors in shaping campaign war chests. Absent stronger, faster disclosure rules and matching credits for small donations, the public will have less, not more, confidence that policy outcomes are not being subtly swayed by financial clout.

Higher donation ceilings expand the potential influence of wealth on politics and can erode perceptions of equal civic voice when ordinary citizens cannot match the new thresholds. Groups focused on democratic fairness have warned that the governing party is better placed to benefit immediately from higher caps because its donor base includes a higher proportion of large contributions, and that such changes risk entrenching partisan advantages.

Making the $2.54-per-vote subsidy permanent provides predictable, ongoing funding that helps parties maintain staff, research and candidate development between elections. That stability benefits smaller parties with steady vote share and reduces short term scramble for funds. At the same time, when paired with higher private donations it entrenches the resource position of parties that already attract both votes and wealthy supporters. The distribution figures are stark: the Tories would receive roughly $5.5 million annually from the subsidy alone, while smaller parties also collect meaningful sums despite lacking legislative representation. Predictability is valuable, but permanence risks insulating established parties and raising barriers for new movements.

These proposed changes recalibrate the levers of electoral timing and finance in ways that carry both administrative logic and clear political consequences. They promise flexibility and more stable public funding for parties while increasing the sway of large donors and restoring formal discretion over election timing. The net effect on Ontario’s democratic health will depend on complementary safeguards that limit undue influence and preserve a level playing field for voters and parties alike.

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